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ABSTRACT 
 
Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterized by interpersonal manipulation, callous 
affect, erratic lifestyle, and criminal tendencies. Past research has shown that individuals 
high in psychopathy feel less empathy than those lower in psychopathy, and that 
individuals higher in psychopathy sometimes show impaired morality on moral decision 
making tasks. This study examined the relationships between psychopathy, empathy, and 
everyday moral decision making; it was hypothesized that individuals higher in total 
psychopathy, interpersonal manipulation, and callous affect would score lower on 
empathic concern and feelings of wrongness and guilt when completing a moral dilemma 
task. To test this hypothesis, 190 undergraduate participants completed a measure of 
psychopathy, empathy, and an everyday moral decision making task. Consistent with past 
research, results indicated that individuals higher in psychopathy scored lower on measures 
of empathy, wrongness, and guilt compared to those lower in psychopathy. Further 
analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between psychopathy and moral 
decision making once controlling for empathy; results indicated that the strength of 
correlations between psychopathy and moral decision making decreased when controlling 
for empathy. These findings increase our understanding of the relationship between 
psychopathy and moral decision making and imply that empathy plays an important role 
in this relationship. This study holds implications for future therapeutic practices for 
individuals high in psychopathy and for future research.  
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The Relationships Between Psychopathy, Empathy, and Everyday Moral Decision 
Making  
in an Undergraduate Sample 
 
The United States has an extremely large prison population, and a disproportionate 
portion of that population exhibit increased levels of psychopathic personality traits. In the 
United States, there are between 15 and 25 percent of the inmate population that are 
classified as psychopathic by the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), which is 
currently the best established test of psychopathy in a forensic population (Hare, 2003; 
Skeem et al., 2011). Similar prevalence rates are seen in other countries, such as in the 
United Kingdom where there is between a 26 and 28.4 percent psychopathy rate in the 
incarcerated population (Hobson & Shine, 1998). In the general population of the United 
States, less than one percent can be classified as psychopathic (Hare, 2003; Skeem et al., 
2011).  
Deficits in moral processing in individuals high in psychopathy has been 
recognized since the establishment of the concept of psychopathy, as psychopathy even 
used to be referred to as “moral insanity” (Prichard, 1835). Additionally, it has been 
speculated that the reason individuals high in psychopathy may have deficits in moral 
reasoning is because of their lower levels of empathy. The associations between 
psychopathy, moral decision making, and empathy, however, have yet to be empirically 
tested. The purpose of the current research was to investigate the relationship between 
psychopathy and moral decision making and to assess whether this relationship can be 
explained by the shared relationship with empathy. 
Psychopathy 
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Psychopathy is a personality disorder comprised of four facets: interpersonal 
manipulation, callous affect, erratic lifestyle, and criminal tendencies (Hare, 2003; Skeem 
et al., 2011). The interpersonal manipulation facet includes glibness, over inflated sense of 
self-worth, and pathological lying. The callous affect facet of psychopathy includes lack of 
remorse, shallow affect, lack of empathy, and failure to accept responsibility for actions 
(Hare, 2003; Skeem et al, 2011). The erratic lifestyle facet includes having a proneness to 
boredom, parasitic lifestyle, lack of realistic long-term goals, impulsivity, and 
irresponsibility. Lastly, the criminal tendencies facet includes poor behavior controls, early 
behavioral problems, juvenile delinquency, revocation of conditional release, and criminal 
versatility (Hare, 2003; Skeem et al., 2011). 
The PCL-R, which is the measure that has dominated the field and helped to define 
psychopathy, is the basis upon which many of the definitions and measures of psychopathy 
are based and to which they are compared (Skeem et al., 2011). The PCL-R is used 
primarily for clinical and forensic assessments of psychopathy; other measures have been 
developed to assess subclinical psychopathy in non-clinical settings such as community or 
undergraduate populations, like the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Version III (SRP-III; 
Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, 2015).  
Empathy 
Empathy can be broadly understood to be an affective state that is caused by the 
simulated sharing of emotions with another person (Seara-Cardoso, Neumann, Roiser, 
McCrory, & Viding, 2011). Empathy is an encompassing term that includes eight 
interrelated psychological states: (1) recognizing what a person is feeling, (2) imagining 
what another person is thinking, (3) putting oneself in another’s shoes, (4) projecting 
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oneself into the state of another person or object, (5) feeling the same as another person, 
(6) feeling concern for another based upon their situation, (7) feeling personally distressed 
by another’s negative situation, or (8) matching the behavior of another (Batson, 2011). 
The first four states can be classified as cognitive empathy, the next three can be classified 
as affective empathy, and the last is categorized as behavioral empathy.  
Affective empathy, or emotional empathy, can be defined as a subject’s emotional 
state resulting from observing or imagining another person’s emotional state. The empathic 
state of emotion is isomorphic, but the person experiencing it understands that this 
emotional state is a result of a vicarious reaction to an emotional state of another person 
(Seara-Cardoso et al., 2011; Singer, 2006). Affective empathy (e.g., feeling the same as 
another person, feeling concern for another based upon their situation, and feeling 
personally distressed by another’s negative situation) is consistently found to be impaired 
in individuals high in psychopathy (Lishner et al., 2012).  
Psychopathy and Empathy 
In previous research, psychopathy levels were consistently and significantly 
associated with low affective empathy levels (Lishner et al., 2015). Research by Glenn, 
Iyer, Graham, Koleva and Haidt (2009) showed that higher psychopathy scores are highly 
predictive of decreased abilities to take another person’s perspective and decreased 
empathic concern for another person in a negative situation. Similar results have been 
found in other studies utilizing self-report measures of psychopathy and affective empathy 
(Aharoni, Antonenko, & Kiehl, 2011). The diminished capacity to experience affective 
empathy is one of the best recognized aspects of psychopathy and has been central to the 
concept in its definition as measured by Hare’s PCL-R (Hare, 2003; Lishner et al., 2012). 
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Studies have shown that those higher in psychopathy score consistently lower on tests of 
empathy than those lower in psychopathy (Glenn et al., 2009; Seara-Cardoso et al., 2011). 
One study done by Seara-Cardoso and colleagues (2011) tested if men higher in 
psychopathy could empathize as effectively as men lower in psychopathy when shown 
faces depicting different expressions of emotion. Results showed that when compared to 
those lower in psychopathy, individuals higher in psychopathy were not able to empathize 
as effectively when they were asked to empathize with faces shown to them on a screen 
and imagine what emotion that person was feeling. Female samples have similarly shown 
that high levels of psychopathic traits are correlated with low scores on empathy tests and 
diminished response towards sadness and fearfulness in others (Seara-Cardoso et al., 
2011). Other studies have shown similar results with different prompts. Studies have 
examined the empathic concern of those with varying levels of psychopathy when 
presented with short stories of others in troubling situations and found similar results: lower 
empathic concern ratings in those who are higher in psychopathy when compared to those 
lower in psychopathy (Glenn et al., 2009). 
Examining the relationship between psychopathy and empathy has extended to 
brain imaging as well, and is one of the most objective ways to show if there is a differential 
relationship between those characterized by psychopathy and those not, as it is impossible 
to lie on a brain scan which is characteristic of psychopathy (Meffert, Gazzola, den Boer, 
Bartels, & Keysers, 2013). During empathy inducing tasks, Meffert and colleagues (2013) 
have shown that in average adult brains certain empathy-related areas consistently show 
activity through brain imaging. These areas include the thalamus, hippocampus, portions 
of the temporal, frontal, parietal and medial gyrus, and the parietal, temporal, insular, and 
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frontal lobes. In psychopathic individuals, brain imaging during the same task showed 
reduced activations, especially in the temporal, insular, parietal and the frontal lobes.  
These neural markers of empathy showed significant decreases in activity in individuals 
higher in psychopathy levels when given empathy tasks which required subjects to feel 
emotions of others and witnessing pictures of others expressing emotion (Gonzalez-
Liencres, Shamay-Tsoory, Brune, 2013; Meffert et al., 2013).  
Moral Decision Making 
The concept of morality is one that has been undergoing change in the past few 
decades in the field of psychology. Lawrence Kohlberg was one of the most profound 
researchers and theorists in the field and based his concepts of morality around justice for 
others (Graham et al., 2011). Graham and colleagues point out that Kohlberg’s theory 
focuses on actions taken towards others, specifically how well people treated others. The 
most widely accepted definition of the moral domain is "prescriptive judgments of justice, 
rights and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other" (Turiel, 1983, p. 
3). Anything that is outside of this definition, such as topics that may be considered moral 
decisions for the purposes of topics as religion or politics, are considered to be a non-moral 
domain and are not included in this definition.  
Central to the psychology of morality is studying moral decision making and moral 
judgment (Haidt, 2001). Moral decision making tasks are the most commonly used method 
for studying morality and has extensive verification of external validity (Haidt, 2001). One 
of the most widely used of the moral dilemmas is what is referred to as the trolley car task 
(Greene et al., 2001). The dilemma explains that there is a trolley car going down its tracks 
headed straight towards a group of five workers who will be hit and killed by the trolley 
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car if it continues on its current path. However, there is a switch that can turn the trolley 
car to a second set of tracks that will instead kill three workers on that set of tracks. The 
participant is asked to decide if they will allow the trolley car to continue on its current 
trajectory, or if they would intervene and cause the trolley car to go down the second set 
of tracks (Greene et al., 2001). 
Moral decision making can be broken down into two aspects: impersonal moral 
actions and personal moral actions (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010). Impersonal moral 
actions are actions that have some sort of disconnect between the person choosing the 
action and the people that it is affecting (Cima et al., 2010). Using the trolley car dilemma 
as an example, this would be similar to the scenario presented as the trolley car is moving 
towards five people but you can change the direction of the track to hit only one person. In 
this scenario, the participant would be asked to choose between five people dying and one 
person dying but still have the moral ambiguity of not directly killing either the five or one 
person, whichever group they choose to live and die. On the other hand, personal moral 
actions involve moral actions that are directly involved in the situation and there is no 
disconnect between the people and the decision (Cima et al., 2010). Still using the trolley 
car example, this could manifest in the participant being forced to choose between five 
people dying if they do nothing, or one person dying if they directly push another person 
onto the track in front of the moving trolley. The end result is still the same, one person 
dying or five people dying, but when given a personal moral action the participant is given 
a more direct influence and is made to feel more responsible for the outcome of the situation 
rather than being able to take themselves out of the situation to make the decision an 
impersonal moral action (Cima et al., 2010). 
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Psychopathy and Moral Judgment 
Individuals high in psychopathy are often associated with immoral and sometimes 
violent behavior, and this leads to a prison sentence at a much higher rate than individuals 
low in psychopathy (Hare, 2003; Hare & Neumann, 2008). Given similar situations, 
individuals low in psychopathy and individuals high in psychopathy rate impersonal moral 
actions as morally permissible (Cima et al., 2010). However, individuals higher in 
psychopathy rate personal moral actions as more morally permissible than individuals 
lower in psychopathy (Cima et al., 2010). Therefore, even though individuals high in 
psychopathy show diminished emotional processing, they are either able to maintain a level 
of emotional processing high enough for the purpose of the study or were able to carry out 
the task in a “normal” way without normal emotional processing (Cima et al., 2010). 
However, individuals high in psychopathy also showed a higher acceptance of morally 
inappropriate actions than those who are lower in levels of psychopathy (Cima et al., 2010).  
In the past, research focusing on the relationship between psychopathy and moral 
or ethical decision making has sometimes shown that people higher in psychopathy scored 
similarly as those lower in psychopathy (Aharoni et al., 2011). These results have led to 
the theory that those high in psychopathy are able to recognize what it is that most people 
would consider to be a moral dilemma and are able to choose what most people would 
choose when asked to make a decision. Researchers who have looked at this relationship 
between psychopathy and moral decision making have hypothesized that at the heart of 
psychopathy lies a disconnect between emotional processing and control of behavior, 
rather than the ability to tell which decision is considered to be the moral choice. Therefore, 
those high in psychopathy may be able to tell which choice they should make but don’t 
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choose that option (Aharoni et al., 2011). Research has also shown that people high in 
psychopathy have a reduced value of harm prevention and fairness, but this cannot be 
explained simply by the inability to distinguish right and wrong (Aharoni et al., 2011). 
Therefore, there must be another factor in their emotional processing that contributes to 
this lack of moral values.  
Another theory arose from a study conducted by Cardinale and Marsh (2014), 
where the relationship between psychopathy and moral decision making was examined. 
They found that individuals higher in psychopathy show impaired moral reasoning in 
moral decision making tasks involving causing others emotional distress (in this case 
specifically fear), while finding very minimal impairment when situations involving 
physical harm were presented (Cardinale & Marsh, 2014). Cardinale and Marsh theorized 
that the inconsistency in past studies in the associations between psychopathy and moral 
decision making has been that the scenarios show individuals experiencing varying levels 
of fear in the scenario. This variation in fear levels could be affecting the decision made 
on the moral decision tasks for individuals high in psychopathy (Cardinale & Marsh, 
2014).  
Current Study and Hypotheses 
Those high in psychopathy are low in affective empathy and make different moral 
decisions than those lower in psychopathy during some decision making tasks but not 
others (Hare, 2003; Lishner et al., 2012). It has been suggested that individuals high in 
psychopathy understand what the correct moral decision is when making a moral decision 
not based upon emotional distress, but they have a disconnect in their emotional processing 
which contributes to the past varied results in psychopathy and moral decision making 
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research (Cima et al., 2010). It has also been shown that at the core of psychopathy lies a 
decreased ability to experience affective empathy (Cima et al., 2010). Some researchers 
have assumed that a lack of empathy explains why individuals higher in psychopathy have 
reduced moral decision making. However, to date, research has yet to empirically examine 
the relationships between psychopathy, moral decision making, and empathy. The current 
study aimed to investigate and clarify these relationships.  We hypothesized that total SRP-
III Psychopathy scores, Interpersonal Manipulation, and Callous Affect would all have 
significant, negative correlations with empathic concern because in past research, 
psychopathy has been shown to be negatively correlated with empathy (Lishner et al., 
2015). It was also hypothesized that Interpersonal Manipulation and Callous Affect would 
show significant, negative relationships with guilt, wrongness and empathic concern as 
both IPM and CA have shown to have similar negative relationships with empathic concern 
(Lishner et al., 2015). We also hypothesized that psychopathy and moral decision making 
would be significantly related because of their shared relationships with empathy. The 
specific hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 - Total SRP-III psychopathy scores would have significant negative 
relationships with guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern on a moral decision making task.  
Hypothesis 2 – The facet of Interpersonal Manipulation would have significant negative 
relationships with guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern on a moral decision  making 
task. 
Hypothesis 3- The facet of Callous Affect would have significant negative relationships 
with guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern on a moral decision  making task. 
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Hypothesis 4- The relationships between psychopathy and guilt and wrongness on a moral 
decision making task would be reduced or eliminated when controlling for levels of 
empathy. 
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Method 
Participants 
 Recruitment. A total of 238 undergraduates from Georgia Southern University 
were recruited through the university’s online SONA survey system. Individuals 18 and 
older were eligible for the study, and there were no race, major, or gender restrictions. Each 
participant earned course credit or extra credit towards a psychology course as an incentive 
to participate in the study.  
 Demographics. After data were downloaded from the Qualtrics software, analyses 
were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics (version 23.0). This study included a sample of 
190 participants after excluding 48 participants for not correctly answering all 5 catch 
questions. Participants included in the study consisted of 67 men (35.3%) and 123 women 
(64.7%) aged from 18 to 37 (M = 19.65, SD = 2.18). Of the 190 participants, 115 (60.5%) 
identified as White or Caucasian, 53 (27.9%) identified as Black or African American, 6 
(3.2%) identified as Hispanic or Latino, 4 (2.1%) identified as Asian American, 1 (0.5%) 
identified as American Indian, 9 (4.7%) identified as Multiple Ethnicities, and 2 (1.1%) 
identified as Other. See Table 1 for additional demographics.  
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Table 1 
Demographic Information 
 M SD 
Age 19.65 2.19 
   
 N % 
Gender   
       Female 123 64.7 
       Male 67 35.3 
Race/Ethnicity   
       White or Caucasian 115 60.5 
       African American or Black 53 27.9 
       Hispanic or Latino 6 3.2 
       Asian or Pacific Islander 4 2.1 
       Multiracial 9 4.7 
       Other 2 1.1 
Level in School   
       1st year 88 46.3 
       2nd year 45 23.7 
       3rd year 41 21.6 
       4th year 9 4.7 
       Greater than 4th year 7 3.7 
 
Materials  
 Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Version The SRP-III is a 64 question self-report 
questionnaire that uses the four facets of psychopathy used by the PCL-R (Skeem et al, 
2011). These are interpersonal manipulation (IPM), callous affect (CA), erratic lifestyle 
(ELS), and criminal tendencies (CT). Participants were given Likert-style questions 
ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Using the following key, 
individual facet scores for each participant were calculated, with an R indicating a reverse 
coding for that question. 
 Interpersonal Manipulation: 3, 8, 13, 16R, 20, 24R, 27, 31R, 35, 38R, 41, 45, 
50, 54, 58, and 61R 
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 Callous Affect: 2, 7, 11R, 15, 19R, 23R, 26R, 30, 33, 37, 40, 44R, 48, 53, 56, 
and 60 
 Erratic Lifestyle: 1, 4, 9, 14R, 17, 22R, 25R, 28, 32, 36R, 39, 42, 47R, 51, 55, 
and 59 
 Criminal Tendencies: 5R, 6R, 10, 12, 18R, 21R, 29, 34R, 43, 46R, 49, 52, 57, 
62, 63, and 64 
Example questions for each facet include: 
 Interpersonal Manipulations: “I purposely flatter people to get them on my side” 
 Callous Affect: “I don’t bother to keep in touch with my family anymore” 
 Erratic Lifestyle: “I’ve often done something dangerous just for the thrill of it” 
 Criminal Tendencies: “I have broken into a building or vehicle in order to steal 
something or vandalize” 
The SRP–III was developed to measure psychopathy in undergraduates rather than 
an incarcerated population which is why it was used in this study (Hare, 2003). The SRP-
III is most commonly used measure in non-clinical samples (which are usually 
undergraduate college students) and has been extensively validated to do so (Skeem et al., 
2011). Consistent with past research (Lishner et al., 2012; Lishner et al., 2015), the SRP-
III total scale (α=.92) and the individual facets (Interpersonal Manipulation α=.85, Callous 
Affect α=.78, Erratic Lifestyle α=.77, and Criminal Tendencies α=.73) showed acceptable 
to excellent internal consistency.  
 Moral Dilemmas and Empathic Concern. The moral dilemmas used in this study 
were adapted from a moral dilemmas task created by Seara-Cardozo and colleagues (2011). 
We adapted the items to better fit a United States undergraduate population. An example 
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of a moral dilemma in this task is “You are walking down the street on your way to class 
when you spot a wallet lying on the ground. You pick up the wallet and see that there are 
several hundred dollars inside. You really need money to pay for textbooks, so you decide 
to keep the cash and leave the rest of the wallet on the ground.” Participants were then 
asked “How guilty would you feel?” to measure guilt, “How wrong would this be?” to 
measure wrongness, “How much compassion do you feel for the other person in the 
situation?” to measure compassion, and “How much sympathy do you feel for the other 
person in the situation?” to measure sympathy. Participants were given Likert-style 
responses to the questions ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A Lot). The responses to the 
questions asking for compassion and sympathy were combined to create a total empathic 
concern score. The responses to the 15 morality items were averaged to create an average 
wrongness score, guilt score, and empathic concern score.  For the current study, response 
scores for wrongness (α = .85), guilt (α = .89), and empathic concern (α = .95) showed 
good to excellent internal consistency.  
Demographics. Participants completed a demographics measure asking for age, 
gender, racial/ethnic identity, level in school, major in school, primary language, and 
fluency in English. A full version of this measure can be found in Appendix B. 
Procedure 
 Each participant was given access to the study through the Georgia Southern SONA 
system, which directed them to the online research survey on Qualtrics to be completed at 
a time and place of their choosing. Upon accessing the study, participants first read an 
informed consent (Appendix A) which asked for a digital signature after careful reading. 
Upon completion participants were prompted with the SRP-III, which was untimed. After 
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completing the SRP-III participants were then directed to the Moral Dilemmas and 
Empathic Concern Task. Participants were given 13 seconds to read each scenario, then 
another 13 seconds to read the second part of the dilemma where action was taken by the 
individual in the scenario. Thirteen seconds was determined by pretesting the materials, 
where participants noted that 13 seconds was adequate time to spend with each section 
without being too much time so that there was much, if any, extra time. Participants then 
completed questions concerning guilt, wrongness, compassion, and sympathy. After the 
Moral Dilemmas task, participants completed the demographics questionnaire. Participants 
were then prompted with a screen with instructions to send an email to a set address to 
receive course credit for the study. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Descriptive Statistics including Cronbach’s Alpha, mean, standard deviation, and 
range were calculated for each measure used in this study, and each facet of the measures 
(SRP-III Total, Interpersonal Manipulation, Callous Affect, Erratic Lifestyle, Criminal 
Tendencies, Wrongness, Guilt, and Empathic Concern). Detailed results can be found in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for All Measures 
Scale Alpha M SD Range Possible Min 
and Max 
Range  
Psychopathy      
       SRP-Total .92 144.23 26.71 73-213 64-320 
       SRP-IPM .85 39.87 9.27 19-61 16-80 
       SRP-CA .78 37.59 8.28 18-56 16-80 
       SRP-ELS .77 42.04 8.57 18-63 16-80 
       SRP-CT .73 24.73 6.94 16-49 16-80 
      
      
Guilt .89 5.85 0.93 2.73-7 1-7 
Wrongness .85 6.00 0.73 3.87-7 1-7 
Empathic Concern .96 5.68 0.97 2.87-7 1-7 
 
Gender Differences 
 A series of between-subjects independent samples t-tests were conducted to 
examine potential gender differences for psychopathy, guilt, wrongness and empathic 
concern. Results showed that men scored significantly higher on psychopathy, and 
significantly lower on guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern than did women. Detailed 
gender statistics can be found in Table 3.  
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Table 3 
Gender Group Statistics 
*. Mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); **. Mean difference is 
significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlational Analyses 
 In order to assess relationships between all dependent variables, correlational 
analyses were computed using Person’s product-moment correlation coefficient (r) and 
reported in Table 4. Analyses showed large positive association between total psychopathy 
scores and all four facet scores, as well as large positive association among facet scores. 
Analyses also showed large positive association between guilt, wrongness, and empathic 
concern.  
 As hypothesized, for guilt felt during the moral decision making task and 
psychopathy, there was a large negative association between ratings of guilt and total 
psychopathy scores, a large negative association between ratings of guilt and IPM traits, 
Measure Gender N M SD t dF p d 
Psychopathy         
     SRP-Total Men 67 157.63 22.80 5.48 188 <.001*** 0.85 
                Women 123 136.94 25.92     
     SRP-IPM Men 67 43.73 8.73 4.44 188 <.001*** 0.68 
 Women 123 37.76 8.90     
     SRP-CA Men 67 42.09 6.34 6.02 188 <.001*** 0.95 
 Women 123 35.15 8.20     
     SRP-ELS Men 67 44.73 6.74 3.57 171 .001*** 0.52 
 Women 123 40.58 9.11     
     SRP-CT Men 67 27.07 7.54 3.36 115 .001*** 0.52 
 Women 123 23.45 6.25     
         
Guilt Men 67 5.65 1.01 -2.12 120 .04* 0.33 
 Women 123 5.96 0.87     
Wrongness Men 67 5.81 0.77 -2.76 188 .006** 0.41 
 Women 123 6.11 0.69     
Empathic Concern Men 67 5.48 0.96 -2.09 188 .04* 0.32 
 Women 123 5.79 0.97     
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and a large negative association between ratings of guilt and CA traits. There was also a 
moderate negative association between ratings of guilt and ELS traits, and a moderate 
negative correlation between rating of guilt and CT traits.  
 As hypothesized, for wrongness felt during the moral decision making task and 
psychopathy, there was a moderate negative association between ratings of wrongness and 
total psychopathy scores, a moderate negative association between ratings of wrongness 
and IPM traits, and a moderate negative association between ratings of wrongness and CA 
traits. There was also a weak negative association between wrongness and ELS traits, and 
a weak negative association between wrongness and CT traits. 
 As hypothesized, for empathic concern felt during the moral decision making task 
and psychopathy, there was a moderate negative association between empathic concern 
and total psychopathy scores, a moderate negative association between empathic concern 
and IPM traits, and a strong negative association between empathic concern and CA traits. 
Additionally there was also a moderate negative association between empathic concern and 
ELS traits, and there was a moderate negative association between empathic concern and 
CT traits. 
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Table 4 
Correlational Analyses 
 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  
1. SRP-Total 1 -- -- -- -- --- --- --- 
2. SRP-IPM .878** 1 -- -- -- --- --- --- 
3. SRP-CA .785** .618** 1 -- -- --- --- --- 
4. SRP-ELS .829** .629** .516** 1 -- --- --- --- 
5. SRP-CT .717** .530** .366** .499** 1 --- --- --- 
6. Guilt -.539** -
.531** 
-
.518** 
-
.345** 
-.321** 1 --- --- 
7. Wrongness -.486** -
.480** 
-
.491** 
-
.287** 
-.290** .855** 1 --- 
8. Empathic 
Concern 
-.475** -
.430** 
-
.515** 
-
.323** 
-.234** .830** .799** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
In order to assess relationships between all dependent variables after controlling for 
empathic concern, partial correlational analyses were computed and are reported in Table 
5. Analyses showed moderate to large positive correlations between total psychopathy 
scores and all four facet scores. Analyses also showed a large positive correlation between 
guilt and wrongness. 
For guilt felt during the moral decision making task and psychopathy after 
controlling for empathy, there was a weak negative association between ratings of guilt 
and total psychopathy scores, a moderate negative association between ratings of guilt and 
IPM traits, and a weak negative association between ratings of guilt and CA traits. There 
was also a weak negative correlation between ratings of guilt and ELS traits, and a weak 
negative association between ratings of guilt and CT traits. 
For wrongness felt during the moral decision making task and psychopathy after 
controlling for empathy, there was a weak negative association between ratings of 
wrongness and total psychopathy, a weak negative association between ratings of 
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wrongness and IPM traits, and a weak negative association between ratings of wrongness 
and CT traits. There was also a weak negative association between wrongness and CT 
traits, and there was no association between wrongness and ELS traits.  
In comparison with analyses run before controlling for empathic concern, analyses 
after controlling for empathic concern showed decreased strength of all associations 
examined in this study. 
 
Table 5 
Correlational Analyses after Controlling for Empathic Concern 
 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  
1. SRP-Total 1 -- -- -- -- --- --- 
2. SRP-IPM .848*** 1 -- -- -- --- --- 
3. SRP-CA .716*** .513*** 1 -- -- --- --- 
4. SRP-ELS .811*** .574*** .431*** 1 -- --- --- 
5. SRP-CT .705*** .486*** .290*** .458*** 1 --- --- 
6. Guilt -.294*** -.345*** -.190** -.146** -221** 1 --- 
7. 
Wrongness 
-.204** -.251*** -.155* -.050 -.165** .572*** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 
0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Discussion 
 The purpose of this research was to assess the relationship between psychopathy, empathy, 
and everyday moral decision making in an undergraduate sample. Specifically, this study 
examined how much of a role empathy plays in everyday moral decision making tasks when 
examining psychopathy levels.  
 Gender differences were examined for psychopathy and findings were consistent with past 
research. Men scored higher on average in every facet of psychopathy, as well as in total 
psychopathy. This is consistent with past research which has shown that men on average score 
higher than women on psychopathy measures (Glenn, 2009; Seara-Cardoso et al., 2013). 
Additionally, this study found that men scored significantly lower than did women on empathic 
concern, wrongness, and guilt. This is consistent with past research as men score higher on average 
on psychopathy tests, and lower on empathy tests when compared to women (Lishner et al., 2015; 
Seara-Cardoso et al., 2011).   
 Hypothesis 1 stated that participants that scored higher in total psychopathy would score 
lower on guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern. Hypothesis 2 stated that individuals who scored 
high in IPM traits would score lower on guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern. Additionally, 
hypothesis 3 stated that participants that scored high in CA traits would also score lower on guilt, 
wrongness, and empathic concern. Hypothesis 4 stated that the relationships between psychopathy 
and moral decision making would be reduced when controlling for levels of empathy. All of these 
hypotheses were supported by the results of this study. Congruent with past research, results 
suggest that psychopathy does play an important role in the amount of empathy, guilt and 
wrongness felt by participants in everyday moral dilemmas. In addition to finding that SRP-III 
psychopathy scores, IPM traits, and CA traits all had strong, significant, negative correlations with 
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guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern, this study also showed that ELS traits and CT traits also 
showed moderate significant negative correlations with guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern. 
These results are similar to past research when looking at the relationships between psychopathy 
and empathy (Lishner et al., 2015) and help to clarify the ambiguous relationship between 
psychopathy and moral decision making. Current results indicate that individuals higher in 
psychopathy rated the personal moral dilemmas used in this study as less wrong, and they would 
feel less guilt, showing similarities to research which has shown that individuals high in 
psychopathy rate personal moral dilemmas as more permissible (Cima et al., 2010).  
 Partial correlations controlling for empathic concern were conducted to determine the 
strength of the association between psychopathy and moral decision making when empathy was 
removed. After controlling for empathy, the strengths of the associations decreased, but were still 
significant in all relationships except for the relationship between ELS traits and wrongness. Total 
SRP-III psychopathy scores were still significantly correlated with both guilt and wrongness 
however the strength of the correlations were reduced from strong to moderate. This same 
reduction in correlation strength from strong to moderate was also observed in ELS traits and CA 
traits where strengths of correlations were similarly reduced from strong to moderate when 
compared to guilt and wrongness. After controlling for empathic concern, there was also a decrease 
shown in the relationship between ELS traits and guilt and wrongness, as well as a decrease shown 
in the relationships between CT traits and guilt and wrongness. The relationship between ELS 
traits and wrongness before controlling for empathic concern was a moderate strength. After 
controlling for empathic concern, there was no longer a relationship between the two variables. 
The relationship between ELS traits and guilt also decreased, to a small relationship. The 
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relationships between CT traits and both guilt and wrongness both decreased from moderate to 
small when empathic concern was controlled for.  
This decrease in strength of correlations supports the theory that empathy plays a role in 
moral decision making for individuals high in psychopathy. Past research has shown that empathy 
is decreased in individuals high in psychopathy, and has also shown that individuals high in 
psychopathy rate personal moral dilemmas as more permissible than individuals low in 
psychopathy (Cima et al., 2010; Lishner et al., 2015). The variation in the results from past research 
regarding the relationship between psychopathy and moral decision making could be explained by 
the fact that individuals high in psychopathy may make different decisions on moral decision 
making tasks when the tasks have a clear individual with which the participants are supposed to 
empathize. This may give participants who are lower in psychopathy the opportunity to empathize 
with these individuals and make a decision that those higher in psychopathy would not make as 
they do not empathize as much with targets in the moral dilemmas. The fact that the relationships 
between the facets of interpersonal manipulation and callous affect and levels of guilt and 
wrongness were reduced, but not eliminated when controlling for empathy suggests that empathy 
is not the only factor that links psychopathy and moral decision making. 
Implications for Research and Practice 
 The results of this study help to show that the relationship between psychopathy and 
everyday moral decision making is related to empathy levels. While this is a preliminary study and 
needs more research to fully explore all theoretical and practical implications of this finding, it 
does help to give a possible direction for future research. Future research investigating the 
relationship between psychopathy and moral decision making should take into account empathy 
levels for the other individuals in the dilemmas. For instance, if the scenario presented is a personal 
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dilemma that involves one specific person for the participant to be able to empathize with, future 
researchers should expect to see that participants higher in psychopathy will score differently than 
those who are lower in psychopathy, since those higher in psychopathy will not empathize as well 
as with the individual in the scenario compared to those lower in psychopathy. Further research 
needs to be done to determine if the results of this study will be replicated for similar but not 
identical methodologies, such as looking at non-undergraduate populations, dilemmas that are not 
considered to be every day, and dilemmas that do not specify one particular person to feel empathy 
towards. However, these preliminary findings could hold implications for future directions for 
therapeutic techniques for individuals who are higher in psychopathy. These implications include 
possible empathy exercises for those higher in psychopathy to try to increase the amount of 
empathy felt for others in negative situations. This could help to improve personal moral decision 
making. 
Limitations 
 This study had several limitations that could be worth exploring in future research. This 
study used self-report measures to assess all of the variables of the study including psychopathy, 
empathy, guilt, and wrongness. There is no way to know if participants responded truthfully to all 
questionnaires or not. For future research, it may be possible to use observational measures of 
psychopathy and empathy rather than self-report measures. This study also used a convenience 
sample of only undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at Georgia Southern 
University. Future research could expand on this by applying the concepts to a diverse population 
with a wider range of ages, educational backgrounds, and locations that this study did not include. 
This study also did not manipulate any variables so causation cannot be implied. Future research 
could attempt to manipulate the variables in this study to test for causal relationships between 
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psychopathy, empathy, and moral decision making. Future research could also explore mediation 
models to see if empathy partially or fully mediates the relationships between psychopathy and 
moral decision making. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the results of this research showed that empathy plays a role in moral 
decision making for those high in psychopathy. Individuals higher in psychopathy feel less 
empathy for those in personal moral decision making tasks and find the negative action taken 
towards the individuals in the tasks to be less wrong than those who are lower in psychopathy. 
This is a field that needs more research to explore what factors are contributing towards the 
differences in moral decision making by individuals lower and higher in psychopathy.  
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Appendix A 
Informed Consent 
Personality and Moral Judgment Survey 
  
This study is being conducted by Justin Kemple, Courtney Beussink, and Dr. Amy Hackney. Justin 
Kemple is an undergraduate student, Courtney Beussink is a student in the Master’s Experimental 
Psychology, and Dr. Amy Hackney is a faculty member of the Psychology Department at Georgia 
Southern University. 
  
The purpose of this research is to assess the relationship between personality and moral judgments. 
Participation in this research will include completing questionnaires assessing beliefs on various 
topics, a questionnaire assessing personality, and a demographics questionnaire. 
  
Risks associated with this experiment are no greater than those found in common everyday 
activities, such as reading or watching the news, or viewing social media. Possible risks include 
slight physical or mental discomfort due to the content of some of the questions. 
  
Participation in this study will not benefit you directly. However, your participation may benefit 
others by contributing to a body of knowledge that can be used to improve our understanding of 
how certain factors may affect decision making. 
  
Participation in this study will take approximately 30 minutes. 
  
This study is completely anonymous. Your name and any other identifying information will not 
be linked with any information you provide nor will it be attached to or stored with your responses. 
All data will be stored on a password protected data file for at least seven years and only the 
research team will have access to the data. Deidentified or coded data from this study may be 
placed in a publically available repository for study validation and further research. You will not 
be identified in the data set or any reports using information obtained from this study and your 
confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure. Subsequent uses of records and 
data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect the anonymity of individuals and 
institutions. Your name and other identifying information will never be reported in connection 
with your responses. The fact that you completed this study will remain anonymous to the fullest 
extent of the law. 
  
Participants have the right to ask questions and have those questions answered. If you have 
questions about this study, please contact the primary researcher, whose contact information is 
located on SONA. For questions concerning your rights as a research participant, contact Georgia 
Southern University Office of Research Services and Sponsored Programs at 912-478-0843. 
  
Your participation in this study will fulfill 0.5 credit units of your “experiment participation” 
assignment in your Introduction to Psychology course (please see the handout provided in your 
class for details regarding your assignment). If you have met the criteria for that assignment, your 
participation in this study will provide you with 0.5 units of extra credit toward your grade if 
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allowed by your instructor. Students enrolled in courses other than Introduction to Psychology 
who wish to participate will receive credit that will be decided by your course instructor. You will 
have other opportunities to fulfill this course requirement if you choose not to participate in this 
study by participating in another or completing an alternative assignment. 
  
You may withdraw from this study at any time. If you decide not to participate, please contact the 
primary researcher. You may stop at any time during the study and you may withdraw your data 
after completing the experiment. You may also skip any question that causes discomfort or 
distress. Completion of the survey implies that you agree to participate and your data may be used 
in this research. There is no penalty for deciding not to participate in the study. You may decide at 
any time you don’t want to participate further and may withdraw without penalty or retribution. 
  
You must be 18 years of age or older to consent to participate in this research study. Since we 
cannot obtain your signature, we must obtain your consent through other means. If you have read 
and understood the instructions and terms of this study and would like to participate as a volunteer, 
please click the "I Agree" box below and click >> to begin the survey. If you do not wish to take 
this survey or are hesitant about participating, check the “I Disagree” box below and then click >> 
to exit out of the survey. 
 
You may print a copy of this consent form to keep for your records. This project has been reviewed 
and approved by the GSU Institutional Review Board under tracking number H16313. 
 
I have read and understood the above consent form and wish to participate in this study. 
 
  I Agree   I Disagree 
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Appendix B  
 
Demographics Questionnaire 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Complete the following demographic information. Please note that all 
personal information will be kept completely confidential and none of the responses you 
provide will be connected to your name, email address, or other identifying information. 
 
1. Age (in years): ________ 
 
2. Gender (Select one):   
 Female     Male     Transgender (specify) _______     Other (specify) _______ 
 
3. Which of the following best describes your racial/ethnic identity? (Select all that apply) 
 African American or Black   
 American Indian or Alaskan Native  
 Asian or Pacific Islander  
 Hispanic or Latino 
 White or Caucasian 
 Other (specify) ________________ 
   
4. Which of the following best describes your level in school? (Select one) 
 1st year        2nd year        3rd year        4th year        Other (specify) _______ 
 
5. What is your major in school? ________________ 
 
6. Is English your primary language?   
 Yes  No 
 
7. Would you consider yourself fluent in English?   
 Yes  No 
 
 
